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Abstract 
 
In this discussion paper, I seek to challenge Hylarie Kochiras’ recent claims on 
Newton’s attitude towards action at a distance, which will be presented in section 1. 
In doing so, I shall include the positions of Andrew Janiak and John Henry in my 
discussion and present my own tackle on the matter (section 2). Additionally, I seek to 
strengthen Kochiras’ argument that Newton sought to explain the cause of gravity in 
terms of secondary causation (section 3). I also provide some specification on what 
Kochiras calls ‘Newton’s substance counting problem’ (section 4). In conclusion, I 
suggest a historical correction (section 5).  
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1. Kochiras’ Claims on Action at a Distance 
 
The Principia clearly entails the possibility of action at a distance. But did 
Newton accept this possibility? In the Principia, Newton had shown that gravity acts, 
not mechanically, i.e. not in proportion to the surfaces of bodies on which it acts “as 
mechanical causes are wont to do” (Newton, 1999 [1726], p. 943), but in proportion 
to the quantify of solid matter (see the Corollaries to Proposition VI of Book III of the 
Principia in ibid., pp. 809-810 and the Scholium to Proposition LIII in Book II in 
ibid., pp. 789-790). Moreover, in these Corollaries he had concluded that the celestial 
regions contain large voids (see also Query 28 in Newton, 1979 [1730], p. 365, p. 
368). In the General Scholium, this point was rendered more explicit: “All these 
regular motions do not have their origin in mechanical causes, since comets go freely 
in very eccentric orbits and into all parts of the heavens” (Newton, 1999 [1726], p. 
940). Newton had established that gravity cannot be produced by the direct contact of 
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material bodies and, consequently, he had shown that whatever causes gravity does so 
in a non-mechanical or immaterial way.1 A standard mechanical ether or vortex was 
shown to be inconsistent with astronomical observation. Only an extremely rarified 
material ether could be rendered consistent with the results harvested in the Principia. 
While, as will be made clear in the discussion in subsection 2.1, Newton at some point 
entertained the possibility of such extremely rarified mechanical ether, by 1694 he 
had definitely abandoned this option for good.  
In a recent paper in this journal, Hylarie Kochiras seeks to chart the complex 
interaction between Newton’s empiricism and his inclination towards certain 
metaphysical and rationalist principles (Kochiras, 2009, p. 268). One of the 
metaphysical principles Newton seems to endorse, according to Kochiras, is “the 
Scholastic maxim that matter cannot act where it is not” (ibid., p. 275). Accordingly, 
when she discusses Newton’s fourth letter to Richard Bentley (25 February 1692/3), 
she concludes: “Here Newton appears to affirm the Scholastic metaphysical principle: 
matter cannot act where it is not” (ibid., p. 268). The key passage from Newton’s 
fourth letter to Bentley reads as follows: 
 
Tis inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, should (without ye 
mediation of something else wch is not material), operate upon & affect 
other matter wthout mutual contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense of 
Epicurus, be essential & inherent in it. And this is one reason why I desired 
you not to ascribe innate gravity to me. That gravity should be innate 
inherent & essential to matter so yt one body may act upon another at a 
distance through a vacuum wthout the mediation of any thing else & by & 
through wch their action and force may be conveyed from one to another is 
to me such an absurdity that I beleive no man who has in philosophical 
matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must 
be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but 
whether this agent be material of immaterial is a question I left to ye 
consideration of my readers. (Newton, 1959-1977, III, pp. 253-245) 
 
The meaning of this important passage will be discussed in subsection 2.1. In the 
accompanying footnote 5, Kochiras states, in reply to correspondence with John 
Henry,2 that “interpreting Newton as denying action at a distance by no means forces 
me to the view that he penned the first and last sentences in distraction” (Kochiras, 
2009, p. 268). “For”, she continues in the same footnote, “as I read them, Newton 
states his own view in the first sentence [to wit, “Tis inconceivable, that inanimate 
brute Matter, should (without ye mediation of something else wch is not material), 
operate upon & affect other matter wthout mutual contact; as it must if gravitation in 
the sense of Epicurus, be essential & inherent in it.”], while in the last [to wit: 
“Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but 
whether this agent be material of immaterial is a question I left to ye consideration of 
my readers.”] he describes what he did in the Principia, which was to refrain from 
stating his own view.”  
Moreover, in footnote 50 (Kochiras, 2009, p. 273 [italics added]), Kochiras notes:  
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The question of whether Newton allowed action at a distance is of course 
the focus of debate. The extreme positions are occupied by John Henry 
(1994) and Andrew Janiak (2007, 2008). Henry argues that Newton fully 
accepted action at a distance by accepting active powers as inessential 
powers of matter, superadded by God. In support of this interpretation, he 
takes Newton’s reference to Epicurus, in the above-quoted letter to Bentley, 
to be highly significant; he reads Newton as rejecting only the Epicurean 
notion that gravity is essential to matter. Accordingly, Henry reads 
Newton’s remark that gravitation requires ‘the mediation of something else 
which is not material’ to refer to God’s mediation between the way that 
matter is essentially, and the way that God actually created it, by 
superadding active powers. For Henry, the opening of Query 31 is then a 
straightforward assertion that material particles do possess active powers 
that enable them to act distantly. Newton’s qualifying remarks there and in 
the General Scholium, to the effect that he does not know gravity’s cause, 
should not be understood to mean that he denied active powers to matter or 
denied action at a distance. He rather means to say that he simply does not 
know which sort of matter bears these active powers—ordinary matter, or 
the matter of the aether. In further support of his position, Henry points to 
Bentley and Locke as Newton’s spokesmen, for both accepted gravity as a 
superadded active power of matter. (While I cannot fully engage with 
Henry’s argument here, I have argued that the thesis of superaddition 
cannot easily be squared with Newton’s empiricism, and, when Newton 
speaks of mediation, contextual remarks indicate that he has spatial 
mediation in mind. As for Newton’s disavowal of knowing gravity’s cause, 
one difficulty I see in Henry’s explanation is that the notion of a material 
aether is quite problematic; as noted subsequently, it threatens regress.) 
 
With respect to Newton’s Letter to Bentley on 25 February 1692/3, Kochiras 
introduces two connected assumptions, scilicet she assumes (1) that in the first and 
final sentence Newton is addressing the same topic, i.e. she assumes that the issue of 
mediation, as introduced in the first sentence, is the same as the issue of agency, 
introduced in the final sentence and (2) that by that time Newton had already 
embraced an immaterial explanation of gravity.3 
In 2.1, I shall argue that both assumptions are debatable and historically 
untenable. It will be argued that Kochiras’ interpretation of Newton’s letter to Bentley 
on 25 February 1692/3 is based on a selective reading of Newton’s corpus and that her 
account of Newton’s views on action at a distance is mistaken. Note, by the way, that 
Kochiras’ discussion of Newton’s views on action at a distance is essentially based on 
essentially two fragments of Newton’s corpus: Newton’s fourth letter to Bentley 
(1692/3) and the General Scholium (1713). I shall also contextualise Newton’s views 
on action at a distance by taking into account several other historical documents. On 
the basis of this, I shall defend a more adequate position on the issue at stake (see 
subsection 2.2). In her paper, Kochiras steers clear of showing what a proper account 
on the matter should look like and, moreover, by her reply to Henry’s she tends to 
obscure the discussion, rather than to enlighten it. 
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2. Newton on Action at a Distance 
 
I start my discussion by pointing out that a thorough contextualisation of all 
relevant material related to action at a distance (including Newton’s manuscripts) is 
currently lacking in Kochiras’ (and Janiak’s) interpretation is. By taking additional 
resources into account, a more subtle and plausible reconstruction of Newton’s views 
on the matter is within reach, or so I shall argue. A solid interpretation of Newton’s 
fourth letter to Bentley cannot be established without proper contextualisation of the 
documents referred to – I therefore strongly suggest that in future discussions of 
Newton’s attitude towards action at a distance due consideration is given to them. 
 
2.1. Evidence suggesting that (1) and (2) are not unproblematic 
 
According to Kochiras, Newton states his own view in the first sentence of his 
fourth letter to Bentley (“Tis inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, should 
(without ye mediation of something else wch is not material), operate upon & affect 
other matter wthout mutual contact [...]”), while in the last sentence (“[...] but whether 
this agent be material of immaterial is a question I left to ye consideration of my 
readers.”) he describes what he did in the Principia, which was to refrain from stating 
his own view. In what follows, I shall develop a more natural way to interpret the key 
passage of Newton’s fourth letter to Bentley. 
Let me begin by pointing out that, when Newton questioned the Cartesian vortex 
cosmology, he was already in his forties. Before De motu Newton was inclined to 
explain gravitation in mechanical terms. In 1680-1681, when drafting up some 
propositions on cometary motion, Newton still seemed to think along the lines of a 
vortex cosmology (cf.: “2. Materiam coelorum fluidam esse. 3. Materiam ↓coelorum↓ 
illam circa centrum systematis cosmici secundum cursum Planetarum gyrare.” (CUL 
Add. Ms. 3965, fo. 613r)).4 Consistent with this, in his 1680/1 correspondence with 
Thomas Burnet, Newton claimed that vortices offered a sensible explanation of 
gravity and he relied on centrifugal forces for the explanation of the celestial motions 
(Newton, 1959-1977, II, pp. 319-334). In De motu and the Principia all this was to 
change dramatically.  
When Fatio De Duillier was working on his De la cause de la pesanteur (1690) 
(De Duillier, 1948-9), in which he introduced a mechanical ether to explain 
gravitation, he pointed out in a letter to Huygens on 24 February 1689/90, that “Je 
marquerai seulement en passant que Mr. Newton trouve que l’experience s’accorde 
avec cette pensée” (Newton, 1959-1977, III, p. 69).5 Later, in a memorandum by 
David Gregory on 28 December 1691, however, it is reported that “Mr Newton and 
Mr Hally [sic] laugh at Mr Fatios manner of explaining gravity” (ibid., III, p. 191). In 
a letter to Leibniz on 30 March 1694, De Duillier wrote that “Monsr. Newton est 
encore indeterminé entre ces deux sentiments. Le premier que la cause de la de la 
Pesanteur soit inherente dans la matiére par une Loi immediate du Createur de 
l’Univers: et l’autre que la Pesanteur soit produite par la cause Mécanique que j’en ai 
trouvée” (ibid., III, p. 309). These sources indicate that Newton between February 
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1689/90 and March 1694 wavered between a mechanical and immaterial explanation 
of gravity. We do know, however, with certainty that from May 1694, i.e. the time 
when David Gregory saw Newton’s Classical Scholia, Newton no longer considered a 
mechanical agent as a plausible candidate to explain gravitation, for in the Classical 
Scholia he posited an immaterial agent as the cause of gravity (see section 3).  
The data gathered above shows two things: first, before May 1694 Newton 
wavered between a mechanical and immaterial agent or explanation for gravitation; 
secondly, only after May 1694 did Newton commit himself to an immaterial agent to 
account for gravitation. Therefore, in 1692/3 Newton had not yet made his mind up on 
the matter and he genuinely doubted whether the agent producing gravitation is 
material or immaterial. It was only by 1694 that Newton made up his mind and opted 
for an immaterial agent. Thereafter, he consistently clung to an immaterial agent as 
explanation of gravitation. To suggest, therefore, that in his fourth letter to Bentley 
Newton was communicating his own (immaterial) candidate for the explanation of 
gravity, is thus highly implausible and contrary to the historical records. Newton was 
not contrasting his own candidate and “what he did in the Principia”: he was 
reporting on two causes of gravity – one mechanical, the other immaterial – which he 
considered as equally plausible at that time. Nothing of the above context is 
mentioned in Kochiras, 2009 (nor in Janiak, 2007 and 2008, for that matter). 
That Newton distinguishes between the issue of mediation, as introduced in the 
first sentence, and the issue of agency, as introduced in the final sentence, is 
suggested by the context of Newton’s letters to Bentley – a context which is simply 
absent from Kochiras’ discussion. Note that the sentence immediately preceding the 
key passage from Newton’s letter to Bentley on 25 February 1692/3, which I have 
quoted in section 1, is the following: “The last clause of your second Position I like 
very well.” (Newton, 1959-1977, III, p. 253). The clause from Bentley’s letter on 18 
February 1692/3 to which Newton refers to is:  
 
[Sir, I make account, yt your courteous suggestion by your Last, yt a Chaos 
is inconsistent with ye Hypothesis of innate Gravity, is included in this 
paragraph of mine.] and again, tis inconceivable, yt inanimate brute matter 
should (without a divine impression) operate upon & affect other matter 
without mutual contact: as it must be, if gravitation be essential and 
inherent in it.” (ibid., III, p. 249 [italics added]). 
 
Therefore, it seems that with the first occurrence of “mediation” Newton was 
referring to God’s activity and intervention in rerum naturae (hence his words:  
“without ye mediation of something else wch is not material”). Let me elaborate this 
point. First of all, I strongly object to Kochiras’ contention that John Henry “reads 
Newton as rejecting only the Epicurean notion that gravity is essential to matter.”6 
Henry does not “read” this interpretation into the text; it is what the text itself dictates: 
“Tis inconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter, should (without ye mediation of 
something else wch is not material), operate upon & affect other matter wthout mutual 
contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus, be essential & inherent in it. 
And this is one reason why I desired you not to ascribe innate gravity to me.” [italics 
added]. On the Epicurean account, gravity is an essential and inherent property of 
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bodies. This means that, according to the Epicurean account, “inanimate brute Matter” 
has the capacity of attracting, by its own nature, other matter across a vacuum, i.e. 
“without the mediation of something else.” This implies that matter is not passive and 
that it can activate other matter without any external principles being required – both 
implications were equally unacceptable for Newton. It is this Epicurean view that 
Newton considered as “an absurdity.” Newton emphasized that gravitational 
interaction required the activity of external or external causes and forces. Bodies are 
passive and are moved by activating principles: “[f]or we meet very little Motion in 
the World, besides what is owing to these active Principles” (Newton, 1979 [1730], p. 
399). The Epicurean view of gravity was untenable for Newton to accept since it 
would imply that matter itself was self-propelling and self-activating. This was the 
reason why Newton rejected Epicurean gravity. By contrast, Newton sought to 
establish (1) that Epicurean attraction would result in a chaotic world and, 
correspondingly, that the elegance and harmony of the solar system could only be 
guaranteed by “the design and dominion [consilio & dominio] of an intelligent and 
powerful being” (Newton, 1999 [1726], p. 940) and (2) that matter and motion is 
somehow dependent on God. In order to accomplish the latter, Newton argued that 
God regulates the natural world by means of certain activating principles which he 
had installed and maintains. In the drafts for the first edition of The Opticks, Newton 
would again raise this concern: 
 
Qu 23. By what means do they bodies act on one another at a distance. The 
ancient Philosophers who held Atoms & Vacuum attributed gravity to 
Atoms without telling us the means unless perhaps in figures: as by calling 
God Harmony & comparing ↓representing↓ him & matter by the God Pan 
& his Pipe, or by calling the Sun the prison of Jupiter because he keeps the 
Planets in their orbs. Whence it seems to have been an ancient opinion that 
matter depends upon a Deity for its ↓laws of↓ motion as well as for its 
existence. The Cartesians make God the author of all motion & its as 
reasonable to make him the author of the laws of motion. Matter is a 
passive principle & cannot move it self. It continues in its state of moving 
or resting unless disturbed. It receives motion proportional to the force 
impressing it. And resists as much as it is resisted. These are passive laws 
& to affirm that there are no other [laws] is to speak against experience. 
(CUL Add. Ms. 3970, f. 619r [ca. 1700-1704; italics added]) 7 
 
In sum, on 25 February 1692/3, Newton was convinced that the intervention of 
God, who is surely not material, was somehow required for the production 
gravitational interactions between bodies. However, at that point he was undecided as 
to whether the agent or intermediary producing gravity was material or not. It seems 
therefore that Newton was discussing two separate issues after all. 
 
2.2. Newton on action at a distance: a new interpretation 
 
Kochiras (and Janiak) seem to accept the non sequitur that by rejecting John 
Henry’s super-addition thesis they have succeeded in defusing all points raised by 
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Henry. Note that I do not commit – nor do I need to – myself to Henry’s super-
addition thesis, to which Kochiras objects in section 4 (Kochiras, 2009, pp. 272-276).8 
Henry has, however, adequately noted that the ethers Newton introduced to account 
for gravitation were not mechanical since they “consisted of particles held apart from 
one another, and from particles to other matter, by repulsive forces operating between 
them” (Henry, 1994, p. 123) and that “the aether theories were not intended to be a 
way of avoiding actions at a distance”9 (ibid., p. 135). These points are well taken.10 
Moreover, in the context of his optical research Newton openly allowed the 
possibility of action at a distance (Newton, 1979 [1730], p. 339, pp. 370-371, pp. 375-
376; CUL Add. Ms. 3970, fos. 252r-254r, fo. 257r, fo. 273r, fo. 291r [ca. 1700-1704]). 
The interpretation of Newton’s view on action at a distance I shall now defend 
takes into account the two important points made by Henry, without endorsing his 
super-addition thesis (see additionally, the discussion in Ducheyne, 2009, pp. 237-
239). Newton denied that matter could act at a distance according to its own nature 
(because this would imply that matter would be innately self-acting, an option 
unacceptable for Newton); however, Newton endorsed action at a distance for the 
secondary mechanism producing gravity, because he postulated a very subtle 
“elastick” ether, i.e. an extremely rare medium endowed with strong inter-particular 
repulsive forces,” as an explanation or cause of gravity. Newton was, of course, 
clearly aware that the elastic ether was conjectural and not a demonstrated truth, for in 
the Advertisement added to the 1717 edition of The Opticks he observed that he was 
“not yet satisfied about it [i.e. his attribution of the cause of gravity] for want of 
Experiments” (Newton, 1979 [1730], cxxiii).11 The point is that he was willing to 
entertain this possibility and even make it public. Newton’s elastic ether consisted of 
repellent particles acting at a distance. In a nutshell: Newton rejected action at a 
distance at a macro-level but accepted it at a micro-level. This seems to be supported 
by the Advertisement to the 1717 edition of The Opticks: “And to shew that I do not 
take Gravity for an essential Property of Bodies [i.e. to show that “inanimate brute 
Matter” does not have the capacity of attracting, by its own nature, other matter across 
a vacuum], I have added one Question concerning its Cause [i.e. an attribution of the 
cause of gravity which posits an elastic ether and which supposes inter-particular 
repulsive forces between its constituting particles acting at a distance], chusing to 
propose it by way of a Question” (Newton, 1979 [1730], cxxiii). Newton did not have 
any a priori objections against actio in distans.12 In a nutshell, Newton did not reject 
actio in distans per se, nor did he deem it intrinsically problematic. Newton could not 
accept of action at a distance at a macro-level, for that would entail the approval of 
Epicurean attraction. However, this does not mean that he found the notion of actio in 
distans intrinsically problematic, for in The Opticks he postulated a non-mechanical 
intermediary (micro-level) acting at a distance to account for the explanation or 
cause of gravity. The reason why Newton was happy to introduce, despite the 
“conceptual problems” involved by doing so (cf. Kochiras, 2009, p. 277), an 
immaterial cause of gravity, in casu an “elastick ether” which supposed action at a 
distance among its particles, was that he considered it as a viable means to avoid the 
self-propelling activity of matter and to account for the non-mechanical nature of 
gravitational effects as suggested by empirical evidence. This suggests a rather 
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different interaction between Newton’s metaphysical and empirical considerations 
than the one suggested by Kochiras. 
 
 
3. Newton on the Cause of Gravity and Secondary Causation 
 
Despite my comments in the previous section, I am in full agreement with Kochiras’ 
claim that Newton consistently tried to explain gravity in terms of secondary causation 
(Kochiras, 2009, p. 272). However, I think that her argumentation can be made 
stronger. For, as it stands, many readers might argue that James E. McGuire and Piyo 
M. Rattansi, in their locus classicus on the Classical Scholia, have argued otherwise, 
namely that Newton did at some point explain gravity by referring to direct divine 
intervention.13 In a nutshell, their view is that: 
 
The central purpose of the ‘classical’ scholia was to support the doctrine of 
universal gravitation as developed in these Propositions, and to enquire into 
its nature as a cosmic force. This doctrine is shown by Newton to be 
identifiable in the writings of the ancients. As will become clear, he is not 
using this historical evidence in a random fashion, or merely for literary 
ornamentation. Rather the evidence is used in a serious and systematic 
fashion, as support for, and justification of, the components of Newton’s 
theory of matter, space and gravitation. The evidence is used to establish 
four basic theses, which correspond to the matter of Proposition IV to IX. 
These are, that there was an ancient knowledge of the truth of the following 
four principles: that matter is atomic in structure and moves by gravity 
through void space; that gravitational force acts universally; that gravity 
diminishes in the ratio of the inverse square of the distances between bodies; 
and that the true cause of gravity is the direct action of God. (McGuire and 
Rattansi, 1966, pp. 111-112 [italics added]) 
 
Therefore, we need to adduce appropriate reasons to reject McGuire and Rattansi’s 
interpretation of the Classical Scholia. First of all, it should be noted that claiming that 
God directly causes gravity is not the same as claiming that gravity depends on the 
will of God – for the latter leaves open the possibility of an intermediary. That 
Newton made the latter claim in the Classical Scholia is obvious.14 To the best of my 
knowledge, there is no positive and direct evidence to suggest that Newton 
entertained the former. On Royal Society, Gregory Ms. 247, fo. 14v, Newton noted 
that the Ancients distinguished between god and the spirit producing gravity: “Hunc 
spiritum aliqui a Deo summo distinxerunt & animam mundi vocarunt,” which leaves 
open the possibility of an intermediary (cf. Dobbs, 1991, pp. 36-37, to which Kochiras 
does not refer to).15 The same caveat applies to Newton’s later assertion (ca. 1706) 
that “matter depends upon a Deity for its ↓laws of↓ motion as well as for its 
existence” (CUL Add. Ms. 3970, fo. 619r): again, Newton did not literally and 
positively state that gravitation is produced directly by divine intervention.  
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4. On ‘Newton’s Substance Counting Problem’ 
 
According to Kochiras, Newton’s ‘Substance Counting Problem’ arises as 
follows: 
 
Since his ontology includes spatially extended immaterial substances as 
well as matter, and since these different sorts of extended substances might 
be able to occupy the same place at the same time, it is not clear how many 
substances should be inferred from the properties perceived in a given 
region of space. (Kochiras, 2009, pp. 278-279) 
 
This problem, however, only pertains to universal properties, i.e. properties that 
cannot be intended and remitted, such as gravity. Gravity cannot be remitted and 
intended at equal distances from an attracting body. Consider, by contrast, the case of 
magnetism, which Newton considered as being produced by a short-range attractive 
force that can be intended or remitted (CUL Add. Ms. 3970, fo. 258r [ca. 1700-1704]). 
If we magnetically charge a piece of metal and if we smash it with great force against 
the ground, the magnetic properties will have gone lost. Likewise, if we heat a 
magnetized piece of metal, its magnetic properties will have vanished. In this case, we 
can contrast the effects of a de-magnetized and magnetized piece of metal.16 
 
 
5. Erratum 
 
Finally, I cannot refrain from making a historical correction. In footnote 11 
Kochiras claims that in De gravitatione (CUL Add. Ms. 4003) Newton “does not yet 
have the concept of mass as distinguished from weight” (Kochiras, 2009, p. 269). This 
claim is inaccurate since Newton explicitly referred to quantity of matter in De 
gravitatione when reporting on his own pendulum experiments. Newton began, as 
follows: 
 
For if the aether were a corporeal fluid entirely without vacuous pores, 
however subtle its parts are made by division, it would be as dense as any 
other fluid, and it would yield to the motion of passing bodies with no less 
inertia; indeed with a much greater inertia if the projectile were porous, 
because then the aether would enter into its internal pores, and encounter 
and resist not only the whole of its external surface, but also the surface of 
all the internal parts. Since the resistance of the aether is on the contrary so 
small when compared with the resistance of quicksilver as to be over ten or 
a hundred thousand times less, there is all the more reason for thinking that 
by far the largest part of the aetherial space is empty, scattered between the 
aetherial particles. The same may also be conjectured from the various 
gravities of these fluids, for the descend of heavy bodies and the 
oscillations of pendulum show that these are in proportion to their densities, 
or as the quantities of matter contained in equal spaces. But this is not the 
place to go into this. (Janiak, 2004, p. 35). 
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Newton suggested that the resistance of the subtle ether is very small, namely 10.000 
or 100.000 times less (“decies vel centies mille vicibus minor” (CUL Add. Ms. 4003, p. 
31 (= fo. 19r)) than quicksilver. Moreover, he noted that if such corporeal ether as 
described above would exist then it would act on both the whole external surface and 
on each of the surfaces of its internal parts (“non modo totius externa↓æ↓m 
superficiem↓i↓ sed et omnium internarum partium superficiebus occurreret et 
impedimento esset” (CUL Add. Ms. 4003, p. 30 (= fo. 18v)). However, Newton’s 
experiments with pendulums had shown that the resistance exerted on oscillating 
bodies is negligible, which suggests oscillating bodies describe equal spaces in equal 
times. 17  Therefore, he noted that the gravities of oscillating bodies are as their 
“densities” or quantity of matter (“ut eorum densitas↓tes↓ sive ut quantitas↓tes↓ 
materiæ” (CUL Add. Ms. 4003, p. 31 (= fo. 19r))18 – thereby implying that he did 
conceptually distinguish between weight and mass in De gravitatione. Moreover, it has 
been pointed out that these very fragments contain crucial clues for dating CUL Add. 
Ms. 4003, as we have it (Dobbs, 1991, chapter 5, esp. pp. 142-143; Mandelbrote, 2001, 
pp. 99-100). 
 
 
6. General Scholium 
 
By now, I hope to have made it plausible that Kochiras’ claims on Newton and 
action at a distance are debatable, to say the very least. It is unfortunate that an 
appropriate contextualisation of Newton’s views on action at a distance is simply 
absent from her paper. Because of this, her reading is selective and ultimately biased. 
As Newton himself might have suggested, a justified principle should be consistent 
will all evidence. I hope that, in future work on Newton and action at a distance, the 
vast bulk of Newton’s corpus will be part of that evidence. 
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1
 In Query 28, Newton wrote that gravity is produced by “some other Cause than 
dense Matter” (Newton (1979 [1730]), p. 369). 
 
2
 Here Henry is reported saying: “The standard reading of the passage in the 
letter to Bentley makes Newton seem at best distracted and at worst an idiot for 
saying that the mediating agent of gravity is immaterial and then a couple of sentences 
later [saying] he doesn’t know whether the agent is material or immaterial. This is a 
problem for the standard reading ... but it isn’t a problem for me because I say that he 
first claims that an immaterial God gives matter the power to attract other matter, and 
that a couple of sentences later he is no longer talking about God but is talking about 
 12 
                                                                                                                                                        
the power that God gave to the matter – that power, or the way it operates, might be 
either material or immaterial.” 
 
3
 On Newton and causal explanation see Ducheyne (2005), (2006) and (2009), pp. 
229-237. 
 
4
 These propositions are discussed in detail in: Ruffner (2000).  
 
5
 On CUL Add. Ms. 4005.6, fo. 28r [ca. 1690-1693], Newton wrote in a rather 
neutral tone: “Errant igitur qui corporum particulas minimas corpo ad modum 
particularum arenæ aut lapidum coacervatorum confertim jungunt. Si particulæ aliquæ 
tam dense constipentur, causa gravitans desinet esse proportionalis materiæ. 
Excogitandæ sunt aliæ particulatum texturæ quibus interstitia earum reddantur 
amplissima. Et hæ sunt necessariæ conditiones Hypotheseos per quam gravitas 
explicetur mechanicè. Hujus autem generis Hypothesis est unica per quam gravitas 
explicari potest, eamque Geometra ingeniosissimus D.N. Fatio primus excogitavit.”. 
By ca. 1716-18 Newton’s tone had changed drastically: “Mechanicam gravitatis 
causam D. Fatio olim excogitavit, sed veram esse non probavit. Hypothesis erat, & in 
Philosophia experimentali hypotheses non considerantur.” (CUL Add. Ms. 9597.2.11, 
fo. 3r). 
 
6
 John Henry (1994) is surely to be given the credit for emphasizing the 
Epicurean position to which Newton is reacting against.  
 
7
 A relevant variant is: “What is it by means of wch bodies act on one another at a 
distance. And To what Agent did the Ancients attribute the gravity of their atoms. Or 
what did they mean […] by calling God an harmony & comparing him & matter […] 
to ye God Pan & his Pipe.” (CUL Add. Ms. 3970, f. 291r [ca. 1700-1704; italics 
added]). Convention for my transcriptions: arrows pointing downwards (↓…↓) 
indicate that the text in between them was inserted above Newton’s original inter-
lineation. Arrows pointing upwards (↑…↑) indicate that the text in between them was 
inserted under Newton’s original inter-lineation. Unless stated otherwise, all other 
text-editorial features are as in the original. 
 
8
 The direct evidence in support of Henry’s super-addition thesis is rather slender. 
Indirect evidence for the super-addition thesis is to be found in De Duillier testimony 
to Leibniz on 30 March 1694 (see previous subsection). If Newton had actually 
endorsed this option, it would have been for a very brief period of time. 
 
9
 This observation is correct, for if Newton thought otherwise we would have to 
accept the conclusion that Newton tried to explain away action at a distance at the 
macro-level by reintroducing it at the micro-level. 
 
10
 In Janiak (2007), where Janiak does not refer to Henry’s work, it is claimed 
that Newton rejected action at a distance without further qualification (cf. Janiak 
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(2008), p. 54, p. 172; cf. ibid., p. 53, footnote 5). In Janiak 2008 Henry’s views are too 
quickly dismissed on the basis of an excerpt wherein Henry incorrectly wrote that 
gravity is “a superadded inherent property” (Henry (1994), p. 141). In any case, 
Henry’s super-addition thesis should not detract us from the important points he made: 
that the ether theories did not originate in Newton’s dissatisfaction with action at a 
distance per se, and that Newton accepted action at a distance in his optical work and 
in his work on the cause of gravity. In the subsequent discussion, Janiak nowhere takes 
these two points into account (Janiak (2008), pp. 53-65). 
 
11
 Newton’s account of gravitation as being produced by “the elastick force” of 
mutually repellent minute particles occurs in Query 21 (Newton (1979 [1730]), pp. 
350-352). If Newton’s attribution were correct than gravitational “attraction” would 
result from the repellent forces of the elastic medium in which the celestial bodies are 
situated (cf. ibid., p. 376). 
 
12
 This conclusion was reached earlier in McMullin (1978), p. 144, footnote 13 
and p. 151, footnote 210. 
 
13
 In her article, Kochiras does not refer to McGuire and Rattansi (1966). 
 
14
 For in Royal Society, Gregory Ms. 247, fo. 14r, Newton wrote: “Solum enim 
ens intelligens vi voluntatis suæ ↓secundum intellectuales rerum ideas↓ propter causes 
finales agendo varietatem rerum introducere potuit.” 
 
15
 Dobbs notes that Newton’s claiming that God’s directly causing gravity would 
have been utterly non-explanatory (Dobbs (1991), pp. 197-198. Furthermore, the claim 
that gravity is produced directly by God would have caused some theological 
uneasiness in Newton’s thinking (ibid., Chapter 7), for Newton endorsed the idea that 
“God made & governs the world by his Agents” (CUL Add. Ms. 3965, fo. 368v [post-
1713]). 
 
16
 On gravitational effects Kochiras remarks: “If it is not possible to remove 
immaterial substances or to determine whether or not they are present, it is not 
possible to know whether gravitational effects would occur in their absence.” 
(Kochiras (2009), p. 278). 
 
17
 Later, in Proposition XXIV of Book I of the Principia, Newton started with an 
application of the second law of motion: v :: (Fm × t)/m. If the pendulums are of the 
same length, the motive forces are as the weights: Fm1/Fm2 :: W1/W2. Then the velocities 
in the corresponding parts of the oscillations will be to one another as the motive 
forces and the whole times directly and the quantities of matter inversely: v1/v2 :: (Fm1 
× t1 × m2)/(Fm2 ×t2 ×m1) or  m1/m2 :: (Fm1 × t1 × v2)/ (Fm2 × t2 × v1). Since the velocities 
are inversely as the squares of the times and we assume that the times are equal: 
m1/m2 :: (Fm1 × t1²)/(Fm2 × t2²) :: (W1 × t1² )/(W2 × t2²) or m1/m2 ::  Fm1 /Fm2 :: W1 /W2. 
Hence, if the times are equal, the quantities of matter will be as weights. 
 14 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18
 No further empirical data was provided. Newton’s first uncontroversially 
dateable introduction of “quantitas materiae” is in the initial revise of De Motu 
(Whiteside (1967-1981), VI, p. 92). 
